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Norader's economics


Development economics

The Patters of AIDS's effects of on growth and human capital: Evidence from Africa, with F. Fall 2010
This paper presents a consolidated database on AIDS and growth in the 48 Subsaharan African countries. The econometric analysis undertaken intends to determine both the short term and long term effects of the AIDS epidemics on growth and human capital accumulation.  
Metropolization and development 2009
This paper presents empirical findings on the demand for education in Peru. It builds on this analysis to calibrate a human capital accumulation model. One uses this model to determine theoretically the consequences of the decentralization of education finance in Peru.  
When private education betters long-run public investment in human capital 2006
A theoretical model of growth driven by human capital when agents can both invest in public and private education. Public sector is financed through a flat tax on income which is set through a majority vote. Poor agents are assumed to be more reluctant invest in education. Introducing private education may lead the economy to a high quality public system if he relative efficiency of the private sector is not too high but not too low relatively to the one of the public sector.  

Fiscal policy

Retour sur 60 ans de politique budgetaire, avec A. Doisneau 2009

This article aims to (i) sum-up the characteristics of the main fiscal policy measures adopted by the parliement since 1951 (ii) evaluates their effects on the GDP growth using a methodology inspired by Romer & Romer. A fine analysis of the measures allows to estimate the Keynesian multipliers according to the main motivation of the bill. The effects of fiscal measures on inflation are also investigated.

L'evaluation des effets du Credit d'Impot-recherche, with L. Demmou and E. Massé (Revue economique, forthcoming) 2009
This paper investigates the long-run consequences of the reform of the R&D tax credit on (i) R&D expenditure, (ii) productivity and GDP increase and (iii) the demand of researchers.  

Distribution du surplus distribuable en France (Economie et Prevision, forthcoming)

Decomposition of growth in France since the 80's and analysis of how it has been used to increase wages, increase employment and capital stock. This paper also investigates how the remunerations of factors have absorbed the the oil price variations.  

Human capital and labour market

Indépendant ou salarié ? Effets du diplôme sur le
rendement marginal du capital humain, avec F. Fall
This paper evaluates the returns of education of both employees and entrepreneurs in France.  
When education increases job inequalities 2005
A macroeconomic study of relationship between school lengthening in France and the increased exclusion of unskilled workers on the labour market.  

Field work

Encuesta sobre la vision de la educacion en el Peru (in spanish) 2006
This page presents a household survey I organized in Peru to know better the realities and behaviour of educational investment in Peru. You can access to the survey or contest it (in spanish)  
Informe sobre la encuesta 2006
Main results of this the previous survey (still in spanish)  

Ph. D. Thesis

Financement endogène de l'éducation (in French) 2006
My thesis which is entitled “endogenous education investment” is based on the idea that the way education is financed, influences the propensity to invest of both private actors and governments. In this approach, designing a system which incites agents to invest more allows to increase education quality endogenously.
The starting point of this work was a first survey in Peru. According to empirical studies and international comparisons, public education suffers from underinvestment in Peru. There is a large consensus in the Peruvian civil society supporting this view either. And from the qualitative interviews I ran, it appears to me that people were aware of this problem, especially in the urban areas. However, and despite the fact that education seems to be a key electoral issue, successive governments fail to improve public education quality. Moreover, Peru experienced a rapid and large development of private education in the main cities in the 15 past years.
To explain these facts, I built an OLG model with political choice based on the median voter theory. I showed that a development trap can be derived from endogenous preference for education: The key assumption is that households invest all the more and are all the more willing to support tax increase for education than they are more educated themselves.
To check this hypothesis and calibrate the growth model, I designed a survey derived from the former World Bank survey ENNIV94. Using a grant and my own funds, I recruited a team of five inquirers and gathered data among 1,200 households of both rural and urban areas representative of the provinces of Lima and Puno. Every measures of the “preference for education”, that is desired public investment rate, declared and desired private investment are increasing with education and moreover rises sharply around a certain level. This discontinuity in the preferences can be interpreted as a poverty threshold. Therefore, the country would be unable to improve the quality of education if there is a too large majority of citizens below the poverty threshold.
In the following part of the thesis, I compared various systems of financing for their capacity to reduce poverty rate and favour the emergence of a majority supporting high tax rate and educational expenditure.
I showed that introducing private education in a public system financed through a tax can make the development trap disappear in the long run. Private education allows the medium class to escape from poverty although it worsens inequalities in the short run.
Selective systems, where the government invests more for better students, are not efficient because they do not enlarge the majority supporting high tax rate in the short-run. Progressive taxation seems not to be a good response either because it is only beneficial to the medium class which is not large enough.
Decentralizing the financing at a regional level allows the convergence for any initial distribution of human capital. Indeed urbanization favours human capital concentration. Therefore majorities supporting high tax rate for education can appear in the greatest cities. The convergence of the entire country toward development can be achieved by the progressive extension of the metropolis. This result seems to be consistent with the Peruvian situation, where Lima absorbs investments and economic growth and keeps growing.
Eventually, I considered the case of a free society, funded by an exogenous contribution proportionate to income, and providing additional education to the families which decide to join in. According to numerical simulations, this is the system which would allow the fastest transition toward development.
In the last part, I extended the framework to explain why France experiences both underinvestment in high education and overeducation. I bring empirical evidences supporting the existence of a trap of low education quality. High youth unemployment pushes the young to get many diplomas to improve their chances of getting a job. Nevertheless, students who suspect that they will be overeducated are reluctant to invest too much money in their training. Indeed expenditure per capita is low in French universities. This may deprive the quality of education therefore slow down growth and maintain unemployment rate at a high level.